Re: Letter of Tony G. Valenciano, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017

Mendoza, J.:

Facts: This controversy originated from a series of letters, written by Tony Q. Valenciano (Valenciano) and addressed to then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno (Chief Justice Puno).

In his first Letter, dated January 6, 2009, Valenciano reported that the basement of the Hall of Justice of Quezon City (QC) had been converted into a Roman Catholic Chapel, complete with offertory table, images of Catholic religious icons, a canopy, an electric organ, and a projector. He believed that such practice violated the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State and the constitutional prohibition against the appropriation of public money or property for the benefit of a sect, church, denomination, or any other system of religion.

Valenciano further averred that the holding of masses at the basement of the QC Hall of Justice showed that it tended to favor Catholic litigants; that the rehearsals of the choir caused great disturbance to other employees; that the public could no longer use the basement as resting place; that the employees and litigants of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), Branches 82 and 83 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Legal Library, Philippine Mediation Center, and Records Section of the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC) could not attend to their personal necessities such as going to the lavatories because they could not traverse the basement between 12:00 o'clock noontime and 1: 15 o'clock in the afternoon; that the court employees became hostile toward each other as they vied for the right to read the epistle; and that the water supply in the entire building was cut off during the mass because the generator was turned off to ensure silence.

In his Letter-Comment,10 dated September 9, 2010, Judge Sagun, Jr. informed the Court that his office had already implemented measures to address Valenciano's complaints. He reported that masses were shortened to a little over thirty (30) minutes; that it was only during special holy days of obligation when the celebration of mass went beyond one (1) o'clock in the afternoon; that the pathways leading to the lavatories were open and could be used without obstruction; that there was never an instance where the actions of court personnel, who were vying to read the epistle during mass, caused back-biting and irritation among themselves; that the water generator had been broken beyond repair and decommissioned since December 2009; and that the court employees prepared for the mass before the day officially started, so that the performance of their official duties in court was not hampered.

In her letter,11 Judge Lutero reported that Catholic masses were being held only during lunch breaks and did not disturb court proceedings; that the basement of the QC Hall of Justice could still be used as waiting area for the public; that court personnel and the public were never physically prevented from reaching the lavatories during mass as there was a clear path from the public offices leading to the comfort rooms; that water service interruptions were caused by maintenance problems and not because the water pump was being shut off during mass; and that the elevators could not be used during mass because elevator attendants took their lunch break from twelve (12) o'clock to one (1) o'clock in the afternoon.

Judge Lutero opined that it is not the conduct of masses in public places which the Constitution prohibited, but the passage of laws or the use of public funds for the purpose of establishing a religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. She conveyed the fact that no law or rule had been passed and that no public funds had been appropriated or used to support the celebration of masses. She added that the holding of Catholic masses did not mean that Catholics had better chances of obtaining favorable resolutions from the court.

Accordingly, Judge Lutero recommended that the holding of masses at the basement of the QC Hall of Justice be allowed to continue considering that it was not inimical to the interests of the court employees and the public.

In its Memorandum,12 dated August 7, 2014, the OCA believed that the practical inconveniences cited by Valenciano were unfounded. It, thus, recommended that his letter-complaints, dated January 6, 2009, May 13, 2009 and March 23, 2010, be dismissed for lack of merit and that the RTC and MeTC Executive Judges of QC be directed to closely regulate and monitor the holding of masses and other religious practices within the premises of the QC Hall of Justice

The OCA advanced the view that the standard of Benevolent Neutrality/Accommodation was espoused because the principal religion clauses in our Constitution were not limited to the Establishment Clause, which created a wall between the Church and the State, but was quickly followed by the declaration of the Free Exercise Clause, which protected the right of the people to practice their religion. In effect, the standard of Benevolent Neutrality/Accommodation balanced the interest of the State through the Establishment Clause, and the interest and right of the individual to freely exercise his religion as guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause.

The OCA observed that the present controversy did not involve a national or local law or regulation in conflict with the Free Exercise Clause. On the contrary, Valenciano was merely questioning the propriety of holding religious masses at the basement of the QC Hall of Justice, which was nothing more than an issue of whether the said religious practice could be accommodated or not.

Issue: Whether the holding of masses at the basement of the Quezon City Hall of Justice violates the constitutional principle of separation of church and state as well as the constitutional prohibition against appropriation of public money or property for the benefit of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion.

Ruling: The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the OCA and denies the prayer of Valenciano that the holding of religious rituals of any of the world's religions in the QC Hall of Justice or any halls of justice all over the country be prohibited.

Free Exercise Clause

Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good."

"The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect - freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's beliefs. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare." Justice Isagani A. Cruz explained these two (2) concepts in this wise:

(1) Freedom to Believe

The individual is free to believe (or disbelieve) as he pleases concerning the hereafter. He may indulge his own theories about life and death; worship any god he chooses, or none at all; embrace or reject any religion; acknowledge the divinity of God or of any being that appeals to his reverence; recognize or deny the immortality of his soul - in fact, cherish any religious conviction as he and he alone sees fit. However absurd his beliefs may be to others, even if they be hostile and heretical to the majority, he has full freedom to believe as he pleases. He may not be required to prove his beliefs. He may not be punished for his inability to do so. Religion, after all, is a matter of faith. "Men may believe what they cannot prove." Every one has a right to his beliefs and he may not be called to account because he cannot prove what he believes.

(2) Freedom to Act on One's Beliefs

But where the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions that affect the public, his freedom to do so becomes subject to the authority of the State. As great as this liberty may be, religious freedom, like all other rights guaranteed in the Constitution, can be enjoyed only with a proper regard for the rights of others.

It is error to think that the mere invocation of religious freedom will stalemate the State and render it impotent in protecting the general welfare. The inherent police power can be exercised to prevent religious practices inimical to society. And this is true even if such practices are pursued out of sincere religious conviction and not merely for the purpose of evading the reasonable requirements or prohibitions of the law.

Justice Frankfurter put it succinctly: "The constitutional provision on religious freedom terminated disabilities, it did not create new privileges. It gave religious liberty, not civil immunity. Its essence is freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of religious dogma."

Allowing religion to flourish is not contrary to the principle of separation of Church and State. In fact, these two principles are in perfect harmony with each other.

No Compelling State Interest

Religious freedom, however, is not absolute. It cannot have its way if there is a compelling state interest. To successfully invoke compelling state interest, it must be demonstrated that the masses in the QC Hall of Justice unduly disrupt the delivery of public services or affect the judges and employees in the performance of their official functions. In Estrada v. Escritor, the Court expounded on the test as follows:

The "compelling state interest" test is proper where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of human conduct has different effects on the state's interests: some effects may be immediate and short-term while others delayed and far-reaching. A test that would protect the interests of the state in preventing a substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary. However, not any interest of the state would suffice to prevail over the right to religious freedom as this is a fundamental .right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights - "the most inalienable and sacred of all human rights", in the words of Jefferson. This right is sacred for an invocation of the Free Exercise Clause is an appeal to a higher sovereignty. The entire constitutional order of limited government is premised upon an acknowledgment of such higher sovereignty, thus the Filipinos implore the "aid of Almighty God in order to build a just and humane society and establish a government."

As held in Sherbert, only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests can limit this fundamental right. A mere balancing of interests which balances a right with just a colorable state interest is therefore not appropriate. Instead, only a compelling interest of the state can prevail over the fundamental right to religious liberty. The test requires the state to carry a heavy burden, a compelling one, for to do otherwise would allow the state to batter religion, especially the less powerful ones until they are destroyed. In determining which shall prevail between the state's interest and religious liberty, reasonableness shall be the guide. The "compelling state interest" serves the purpose of revering religious liberty while at the same time affording protection to the paramount interests of the state. This was the test used in Sherbert which involved conduct, i.e. refusal to work on Saturdays. In the end, the "compelling state interest" test, by upholding the paramount interests of the state, seeks to protect the very state, without which, religious liberty will not be preserved.

As reported by the Executive Judges of Quezon City, the masses were being conducted only during noon breaks and were not disruptive of public services. The court proceedings were not being distracted or interrupted and that the performance of the judiciary employees were not being adversely affected. Moreover, no Civil Service rules were being violated. As there has been no detrimental effect on the public service or prejudice to the State, there is simply no state interest compelling enough to prohibit the exercise of religious freedom in the halls of justice.

Accommodation, Not Establishment of Religion

In order to give life to the constitutional right of freedom of religion, the State adopts a policy of accommodation. Accommodation is a recognition of the reality that some governmental measures may not be imposed on a certain portion of the population for the reason that these measures are contrary to their religious beliefs. As long as it can be shown that the exercise of the right does not impair the public welfare, the attempt of the State to regulate or prohibit such right would be an unconstitutional encroachment.

In Estrada v. Escritor, the Court adopted a policy of benevolent neutrality:

With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of religion under certain circumstances. Accommodations are government policies that take religion specifically into account not to promote the government's favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's religion. As Justice Brennan explained, the "government [may] take religion into account ... to exempt, when possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may flourish."

Non-Establishment Clause

On the opposite side of the spectrum is the constitutional mandate that "no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion," otherwise known as the non-establishment clause. Indeed, there is a thin line between accommodation and establishment, which makes it even more imperative to understand each of these concepts by placing them in the Filipino society's perspective.

The non-establishment clause reinforces the wall of separation between Church and State. It simply means that the State cannot set up a Church; nor pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religion, or prefer one religion over another nor force nor influence a person to go to or remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion; that the state cannot punish a person for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or nonattendance; that no tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activity or institution whatever they may be called or whatever form they may adopt or teach or practice religion; that the state cannot openly or secretly participate in the affairs of any religious organization or group and vice versa. Its minimal sense is that the state cannot establish or sponsor an official religion.

In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do. They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establish a state religion.

Father Bernas further elaborated on this matter, as follows:

"In effect, what non-establishment calls for is government neutrality in religious matters. Such government neutrality may be summarized in four general propositions: (1) Government must not prefer one religion over another or religion over irreligion because such preference would violate voluntarism and breed dissension; (2) Government funds must not be applied to religious purposes because this too would violate voluntarism and breed interfaith dissension; (3) Government action must not aid religion because this too can violate voluntarism and breed interfaith dissension; [and] (4) Government action must not result in excessive entanglement with religion because this too can violate voluntarism and breed interfaith dissension."

Establishment entails a positive action on the part of the State. Accommodation, on the other hand, is passive. In the former, the State becomes involved through the use of government resources with the primary intention of setting up a state religion. In the latter, the State, without being entangled, merely gives consideration to its citizens who want to freely exercise their religion.

Guided by the foregoing, it is our considered view that the holding of Catholic masses at the basement of the QC Hall of Justice is not a case of establishment, but merely accommodation. First, there is no law, ordinance or circular issued by any duly constitutive authorities expressly mandating that judiciary employees attend the Catholic masses at the basement. Second, when judiciary employees attend the masses to profess their faith, it is at their own initiative as they are there on their own free will and volition, without any coercion from the judges or administrative officers. Third, no government funds are being spent because the lightings and airconditioning continue to be operational even if there are no religious rituals there. Fourth, the basement has neither been converted into a Roman Catholic chapel nor has it been permanently appropriated for the exclusive use of its faithful. Fifth, the allowance of the masses has not prejudiced other religions.

Section 29 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides, "No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium."

The word "apply" means "to use or employ for a particular purpose." "Appropriate" means "to prescribe a particular use for particular moneys or to designate or destine a fund or property for a distinct use, or for the payment of a particular demand."

Under the principle of noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is found or with which it is associated. This is because a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or phrases, and its meaning may, thus, be modified or restricted by the latter. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole. A statute must be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions whenever possible.

Thus, the words "pay" and "employ" should be understood to mean that what is prohibited is the use of public money or property for the sole purpose of benefiting or supporting any church. The prohibition contemplates a scenario where the appropriation is primarily intended for the furtherance of a particular church.

It has also been held that the aforecited constitutional provision "does not inhibit the use of public property for religious purposes when the religious character of such use is merely incidental to a temporary use which is available indiscriminately to the public in general." Hence, a public street may be used for a religious procession even as it is available for a civic parade, in the same way that a public plaza is not barred to a religious rally if it may also be used for a political assemblage.

In relation thereto, the phrase "directly or indirectly" refers to the manner of appropriation of public money or property, not as to whether a particular act involves a direct or a mere incidental benefit to any church. Otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have placed it before "use, benefit or support" to describe the same. Even the exception to the same provision bolsters this interpretation. The exception contemplates a situation wherein public funds are paid to a priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary because they rendered service in the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium. That a priest belongs to a particular church and the latter may have benefited from the money he received is of no moment, for the purpose of the payment of public funds is merely to compensate the priest for services rendered and for which other persons, who will perform the same services will also be compensated in the same manner.

Ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. As such, the foregoing interpretation finds support in the Establishment Clause, which is as clear as daylight in stating that what is proscribed is the passage of any law which tends to establish a religion, not merely to accommodate the free exercise thereof.

The Constitution even grants tax exemption to properties actually, directly and exclusively devoted to religious purposes Certainly, this benefits the religious sects for a portion of what could have been collected for the benefit of the public is surrendered in their favor.

Here, the basement of the QC Hall of Justice is not appropriated, applied or employed for the sole purpose of supporting the Roman Catholics.

Further, it has not been converted into a Roman Catholic chapel for the exclusive use of its faithful contrary to the claim of Valenciana. Judge Maceren reported that the basement is also being used as a public waiting area for most of the day and a meeting place for different employee organizations. The use of the area for holding masses is limited to lunch break period from twelve (12) o'clock to one (1) o'clock in the afternoon. Further, Judge Sagun, Jr. related that masses run for just a little over thirty (30) minutes. It is, therefore, clear that no undue religious bias is being committed when the subject basement is allowed to be temporarily used by the Catholics to celebrate mass, as the same area can be used by other groups of people and for other purposes.49 Thus, the basement of the QC Hall of Justice has remained to be a public property devoted for public use because the holding of Catholic masses therein is a mere incidental consequence of its primary purpose.

One cannot espouse that the constitutional freedom of religion ensures tolerance, but, in reality, refuses to practice what he preaches. One cannot ask for tolerance when he refuses to do the same for others.

In fine, the Court denies the plea that the holding of Catholic masses at the basement of the QC Hall of Justice be prohibited because the said practice does not violate the constitutional principle of separation of Church and State and the constitutional prohibition against appropriation of public money or property for the benefit of a sect, church, denomination, or any other system of religion.

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